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cohere with the psychic contents it "apperceives." Instead of being any one in particular the "I" it deduces might just as well be the Devil or the Absolute.

In conclusion let me say that the questions I have raised all, I believe, affect the fundamentals of Mr. Russell's system; for in a consistent philosophy these are the parts which most demand attention, and are most worth discussion.

F. C. S. SCHILLER.

CORPUS CHRISTI COLLEGE, OXFORD.

"IMPLICATION AND LINEAR INFERENCE"

MIGHT I say a word on one judgment and its corollary in the courteous and appreciative review of my book in this JOURNAL by H. T. Costello?

The point is that he describes my illustration of self-evidence by the proposition that two straight lines can not enclose a space, as "unfortunate." The reason is, I gather, that experts do not now admit this proposition to be self-evident. And what I want to maintain is that thus it becomes a far more fortunate illustration of my argument than I supposed it to be.

Obviously it is involved in my notion of coherence that theoretically and in principle self-evidence is a matter of degree. There are plenty of propositions no one would trouble to interfere with, but, technically, there is none which has in itself absolute self-evidence. I asserted this position in my *Logic* and applied it to the "Law of Causation," and also showed that the interpretation of the "Laws of Thought" was "relative and ambiguous." Therefore, having later made a concession for the sake of argument, and undertaken to show as a limiting case of my theory a proposition which I believed nearly every one would feel as self-evident, I am fortunate, and not unfortunate, when my reviewer batters down for me the wall I was trying to breach and tells me that the proposition, though constantly taken for self-evident, is not self-evident at all. That is to say, in the light of a wider or more precisely analyzed whole of experience than mine, its supposed necessity does not stand examination. This is quite natural, and of course is a strong support to my view, which was originally formulated owing in part to some hints of Lotze in the same direction which I thought were probably out of date today, and so did not produce in the discussion in my book.

I proceed to the corollary. The reviewer's judgment that the illustration is unfortunate establishes to my mind the point that he

does not follow me in apprehending the test of coherence as involving a genuinely complete empiricism and only rejecting one that is arbitrary and partial. He does not see how (as, e.g., Husserl points out) self-evidence is relative to the relevant whole of experience. Thus I read in the review (p. 416) : "Looking upon the process as an internal dialectic of coherence within thought, they slur over the empirical checks which actually knock a thought-process into shape by unexpected blows from without itself." So (p. 417) : "Only empiricism can select the true one."

Mr. Russell is in the same mythical tradition (*Analysis of Mind*, p. 268, treating expressly of the coherence method). "The attempt to deduce the world by pure thought is attractive.—But nowadays most men admit that beliefs must be tested by observation, and not merely by the fact that they harmonize with other beliefs. A consistent fairy-tale," etc.

And Mr. Arnauld Reid in the *Philosophical Review*, January, 1922, treats perception as a test other than and external to "coherence."

They must all, surely, be speaking of something much less simple on one side, and much less fundamental on the other, than what I am talking about. As early as in the concluding chapters of *Knowledge and Reality* (1885) I pointed out in detailed analysis the obvious fact that every precise perception and every scientific observation is in itself a crucial experiment demonstrating that inference is by coherence. There is, therefore, no alternative method. The human mind in the pursuit of truth works in no other way. The simplest and most classical analysis of the facts, apart from the many well-known passages of Mr. Bradley and others, is, I should say, in Nettleship's Logic Lectures (*Remains*, Vol. I, pp. 181 ff.).

We always test a sense-perception as Macbeth tested his vision of the dagger, by trying if it brings with it something else we expect it to bring. The mind is potentially a system, and puts its questions, or demands its answers, in systematic form.

This characteristic procedure has nothing directly to do with any further question about the ultimate incompleteness of truth. It has nothing whatever to do with ideas of an internal dialectic, of coherence within thought, or with deductions by pure thought, or with consistent fairy-tales, or with a contrast between thought and empirical checks or perception or observation. Does no realist today think it worth while to consider what goes on in any careful perception or observation or on what its precision and truth value depend? It is really as if the hoary jest of our childhood about the German who evolved the camel out of his moral consciousness were

hanging about the minds of realists, and prevented them from attending to what students of actual working logic are talking about. I am much inclined to think that some obsolete superstition of the kind is actually at work.

BERNARD BOSANQUET.

OXSHOTT, ENGLAND.

THE VERIFICATION OF STANDARDS OF VALUE

IT is a familiar contention of pragmatism that the truth as well as the value of ideas is to be judged by their consequences in action. This theory has been applied by Professor Dewey to the subject of practical judgments and moral standards. "The truth of practical judgments," he writes, ". . . is constituted by the issue. The determination of end-means (constituting the terms and relations of the practical proposition) is hypothetical until the course of action indicated has been tried. The event or issue of such action is the truth or falsity of the judgment."¹

In conduct "principles, criteria, laws are intellectual instruments for analyzing individual or unique situations."²

Generalized and classified goods are tools of insight, and in ethics "validation, demonstration, become experimental, a matter of consequences."³

Up to the present the advocates of this theory have been mainly occupied with defending its central thesis against the formalism of older ethical methods. They have accordingly made little if any attempt to apply it in testing specific current ideals and standards of value. They have rather been disposed to avoid such an attempt, on the ground that it would involve the very failing of ethics which they attack, a tendency to excessive and arbitrary generalization. Art and practical conduct, therefore, rather than science, have seemed to them the proper fields for developing and testing standards.⁴

Such procedure, however, is subject to the obvious limitations, recognized by pragmatists, of all common sense thinking in comparison with scientific.⁵

The latter must no doubt abandon its claim to provide absolute

¹ *Essays in Experimental Logic*, p. 346.

² *Reconstruction in Philosophy*, p. 162.

³ *Ibid.*, pp. 169, 174.

⁴ Cf. John Dewey, *The Influence of Darwin on Philosophy*, p. 71; *Essays in Experimental Logic*, pp. 374-381.

⁵ Dewey, *How We Think*, ch. XI.